The African National Congress, South Africa’s ruling party, received a large donation from a mining company used by a Russian oligarch to evade sanctions. Critics say this gift is a bribe in exchange for the ANC’s support for the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine.

A new Chinese-built highway was billed as a benefit for citizens in Nairobi. However, an exploitative toll agreement benefitted the Chinese operators and made the expressway inaccessible for Kenyans.

In an effort to diversify its investments and counter Iran, Saudi Arabia developed new relationships across Africa. For the Saudis, Emiratis, and Iranians, African economies present an opportunity to develop political influence outside of the Middle East, while reaping Africa’s natural resources.

Kremlin-backed Wagner Group mercenaries have worked closely with the Central African Republic’s pro-Russia president. The Wagner Group is working to exploit mineral and economic resources in the country and ensure that the CAR remains in Russia’s favor.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine showcased a myriad of projections of sharp power, from Iran selling new drone technology to Chinese economic support for Russian oil. This combined threat emphasizes the need for democracies to push back against this exploitation of interconnected global systems.

Iran is expanding its influence in Muslim regions of Russia, mainly through economic agreements. Iran aims to circumvent Western sanctions and gain added favorability of Muslim citizens in Russia.

China used the 14+1 Initiative as a means for spreading economic and political influence, employing various tactics such as anti-Western propaganda, sharing Chinese media content with local outlets, infrastructure investments, and vaccine exports.

Two decades of scandals have exposed the corruption, fraud, pollution, dangerous practices, legal violations, and misconduct that are characteristic of projects by China’s largest state construction company, CSCEC, in Georgia.

The Chinese Communist Party strives to cultivate cultural, political, and academic ties in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These efforts are more pronounced in the Republika Srpska, where the authorities tend to adopt a pro-Russian and anti-Western foreign policy stance.

Chinese influence in Serbia is spread through various means. The most conspicuous and successful tools have been economic cooperation between Serbia and China, activities of the Chinese embassy, bilateral visits, “mask and vaccine diplomacy,” and cooperation with Serbian media.

China’s objective is to build an influential pro-Beijing lobby and prevent Bulgaria from joining the group of China’s outspoken critics. In the absence of any substantial initiative as the 16/17+1 format peters out, old-style Chinese propaganda is unlikely to sway many Bulgarians.

North Macedonia is a member of several international organizations, such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and NATO, where the vote of each country counts. Thus, China seeks to ensure North Macedonia’s friendship, or at least neutrality, on resolutions tabled by Western governments.

China exerts influence in Montenegro through economic clout, primarily through huge debt for construction projects that will burden Montenegro for years. China’s investments in Montenegro benefit from a loophole that allows them to escape public scrutiny, competitive bidding, and national regulations.

China’s strategic objectives in Greece are to make the most of the country’s position in the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative; win over Greek political, business, and academic leaders and ensure Athens’ backing of China; and exert influence over the EU through “friendly” member states.

China has inserted itself into Albania’s economy and politics via major investments in air transportation, energy, agriculture, and mining, creating new avenues for leverage. Collaboration with key economic players and networks in turn creates dependencies through which China gains systematic influence.